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アウグスチヌスの時間概念

Augustine's Concept of "Time"

池田光穂

「ですからあなたは何かをお造りになるの に、時間においてお造りになったのではありません。なぜならば時間そのものも、あなたがお造りになった のですから。またいかなる時間も、あなたとひとしく永遠なものではありません。なぜならばあなたは恒存したもうが、もし時間が恒存するとすれば、もはや時 間ではなくなるでしょうから。

 ではいったい、時間とは何でしょうか。 これをたやすくかんたんに説明できる者があるでしょうか。それについてことばで表現するために、思想に おいてでも 時間をとらえることのできる者があるでしょうか。私たちが会話のさい、時間ほど親しみ深く熟知のものとして言及するものは何もありません。それについて話 すとき、たしかに私たちは理解しています。他人が話すのを聞くときも、たしかに私たちは理解しています。

 ではいったい時間とは何でしょうか。だ れも私にたずねないとき、私は知っています。たずねられて説明しようと思うと、知らないのです。しか し、「私は 知っている」と、確信をもっていえることがあります。それは、「もし何ものも過ぎさ らないならば、過去の時はないであろう。何ものもやってこないならば、 未来の時はないであろう。何ものもないならば、現在の時はないであろう」ということです。

 ではこの二つの時間、過去と未来とは、 どのようにしてあるのでしょうか。過去とは「もはやない」ものであり、未来とは「まだない」ものである のに。また 現在は、もしいつもあり、過去に移りさらないならば、もはや時ではなくて、永遠となるでしょう。ですから、もし現在が時であるのは過去に移りさってゆくか らだとするならば、「現在がある」ということも、どうしていえるのでしょうか。現在にとって、それが「ある」といわれるわけは、まさしくそれが「ないであ ろう」からなのです。すなわち、私たちがほんとうの意味で「時がある」といえるのは、まさしくそれが「ない方向にむかっている」からなのです」。——アウ グスチヌス『告白』山田晶訳、第11巻14章、Pp.414-415、1968年

CAPUT 14

Nullo ergo tempore non feceras aliquid, quia ipsum tempus tu feceras. et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; at illa si permanerent, non essent tempora. quid est enim tempus? quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione comprehenderit? quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo conmemoramus quam tempus? et intellegimus utique, cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam, cum alio loquente id audimus. quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio: fidenter tamen dico scire me, quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus. duo ergo illa tempora, praeteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et praeteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est? praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in praeteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse.

ラテン語出典:http: //www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/latinconf/11.html

Nullo ergo tempore non feceras aliquid, quia ipsum tempus tu feceras. et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; at illa si permanerent, non essent tempora. quid est enim tempus? quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione comprehenderit? quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo conmemoramus quam tempus? et intellegimus utique, cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam, cum alio loquente id audimus. quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio: fidenter tamen dico scire me, quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus. duo ergo illa tempora, praeteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et praeteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est? praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in praeteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse.
At no time would you have done anything, because you had done the time itself. and no times are co-eternal with you, because you are permanent; but if they continued, there would be no seasons. for what is time? Who has explained this easily and briefly? Who has spoken or thought about this for a word? But what do we mention more familiarly and familiarly in speaking than time? and we certainly understand it when we speak it, we also understand it when we hear it when someone else is speaking. what then is the time? if no one asks of me, I know; I do not know if I would like to explain it to the inquirer: nevertheless I confidently say that I know that if nothing had passed, there would not have been past time, and if nothing had arrived, there would not have been future time, and if there had been nothing, there would not have been present time. So those two times, the past and the future, how are they, when the past is no longer and the future is not yet? but if the present were always present and did not pass into the past, it would no longer be time, but eternity. If, therefore, the present is time, it is because it passes into the past, just as we say that it is, the cause of which is that it is, because it will not be, so that we cannot really say that there is time, except because it tends not to be.
そして、あなたは永続的な存在であるため、いかなる時代もあなたと共存 することはない。誰がこのことを簡単に、簡潔に説明したことがあるだろうか。誰がこのことを一言でも話したことがあるだろうか。しかし、われわれは時間よ りももっと身近に、親しみを込めて語るものがあろうか。そして、われわれがそれを語るとき、われわれは確かにそれを理解し、また、誰かがそれを語るのを聞 くときにも、われわれはそれを理解する。では、時間とは何なのか。もし誰も私に尋ねないのなら、私は知っている。尋ねる者にそれを説明したいかどうかはわ からない。それでも私は、もし何も過ぎ去らなかったのなら、過去の時間は存在しなかったであろうし、もし何も到来しなかったのなら、未来の時間は存在しな かったであろうし、もし何もなかったのなら、現在の時間は存在しなかったであろう、と自信を持って言う。では、過去と未来という2つの時間は、過去はもは や存在せず、未来はまだ存在しないのだが、もし現在が常に存在し、過去に移らないとしたら、それはもはや時間ではなく、永遠である。それゆえ、もし現在が 時間であるとすれば、それは過去へと過ぎ去るからであり、私たちが「時間である」と言うのと同じように、その原因は「時間である」ことである。

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[XXI] Quorum enim aures piorum ferant post emensam tot tantisque calamitatibus uitam (si tamen uita ista dicenda est, quae potius mors est, ita grauis, ut mors, quae ab hac liberat, mortis huius amore timeatur), post tam magna mala tamque multa et horrenda tandem aliquando per ueram religionem atque sapientiam expiata atque finita ita peruenire ad conspectum Dei atque ita fieri beatum contemplatione incorporeae lucis per participationem inmutabilis inmortalitatis eius, cuius adipiscendae amore flagramus, ut eam quandoque necesse sit deseri et eos, qui deserunt, ab illa aeternitate ueritate felicitate deiectos tartareae mortalitati, turpi stultitiae, miseriis exsecrabilibus implicari, ubi Deus amittatur, ubi odio ueritas habeatur, ubi per inmundas nequitias beatitudo quaeratur, et hoc itidem atque itidem sine ullo fine priorum et posteriorum certis interuallis et dimensionibus saeculorum factum et futurum; et hoc propterea, ut possint Deo circuitibus definitis euntibus semper atque redeuntibus per nostras falsas beatitudines et ueras miserias alternatim quidem, sed reuolutione incessabili sempiternas nota esse opera sua, quoniam neque a faciendo quiescere neque sciendo potest ea, quae infinita sunt, indagare? Quis haec audiat? quis credat? quis ferat? Quae si uera essent, non solum tacerentur prudentius, uerum etiam (ut quo modo ualeo dicam quod uolo) doctius nescirentur. Nam si haec illic in memoria non habebimus et ideo beati erimus, cur hic per eorum scientiam grauatur amplius nostra miseria? Si autem ibi ea necessario scituri sumus, hic saltem nesciamus, ut hic felicior sit expectatio quam illic adeptio summi boni; quando hic aeterna uita consequenda expectatur; ibi autem beata, sed non aeterna, quandoque amittenda cognoscitur.
For whose ears should the pious hear after a life consumed by so many and so many calamities (if this life, which is rather death, is to be called so great, that death, which frees from this, is feared for the love of this death), after so great evils and so many and terrible things at last sometimes through true religion and wisdom atoned and finished so as to arrive at the sight of God, and thus become blessed by the contemplation of the incorporeal light by participation in his unchangeable immortality, which we ardently desire to attain with love, so that sometimes it is necessary to abandon it, and those who abandon it, cast from that eternity with truth and happiness to be entangled in the wretched mortality, in base stupidity, in execrable miseries, where God is lost, where truth is hated, where happiness is sought through filthy wickedness, and this has happened and will happen again and again without any end to the former and the latter in the certain intervals and dimensions of the ages; and this for the reason that they may be known to God in definite circles, always going and returning through our false felicities and true miseries, alternately indeed, but by an incessant revolution, eternal works, since he can neither rest from doing, nor trace those things which are infinite by knowing? Who should hear these things? who will believe? who will carry it? If these things were true, they would not only have remained silent more prudently, but also (so that I may say what I want) they would not have been known more learnedly. For if we will not have these things in memory there and therefore be happy, why is our misery further aggravated here by their knowledge? But if we are necessarily going to know them there, let us at least not know here, so that the expectation here is more happy than the attainment of the highest good there; when here eternal life is expected to be attained; but there the blessed, but not eternal, is sometimes known to be lost. これほど多くの、これほど多くの災難(この生が、むしろ死であるが、こ れを偉大なものと呼ぶならば、この死から解放される死は、この死を愛するがゆえに恐れられるのである)に消費された生の後、これほど大きな災難と、これほ ど多くの、これほど恐ろしいことが、真の宗教と英知によって、ついに神の光景に到達するように償われ、完成され、その結果、神の不変の不滅に参加すること によって、肉体のない光の観想によって祝福されるようになった後、敬虔な者は誰の耳に聞こえるであろうか、 そのため、時にはそれを放棄する必要があり、放棄した者は、真理と幸福のある永遠から投げ出され、神が失われ、真理が嫌われ、薄汚い邪悪さによって幸福が 求められる、惨めな死すべきもの、卑しい愚かさ、ひどい不幸に絡め取られる; その理由は、神に、それらが明確な円環の中で知られ、常に我々の偽りの幸福と真の不幸を行き来し、交互に、しかし絶え間ない回転によって、永遠の業を知る ことができるからである。誰がこれらのことを聞くだろうか、誰が信じるだろうか、誰がそれを運ぶだろうか。もしこれらのことが真実であったなら、彼らは もっと思慮深く黙っていたであろうだけでなく、(私の望むことを言うために)もっと学問的に知られることもなかったであろう。というのも、もし私たちがこ れらのことを現地で記憶することがなく、それゆえ幸福であるというなら、なぜ私たちの不幸は、ここでこれらのことを知ることによってさらに悪化するのだろ うか。しかし、もし私たちが必ずそこでそれらを知ることになるのであれば、少なくともここでは知らないようにしよう。そうすれば、ここでの期待は、そこで の最高の善の達成よりも幸福なものとなる。ここでは永遠の命が得られることが期待されるが、そこでは祝福された、しかし永遠ではないものが、時に失われる ことが知られるのである。
Si autem dicunt neminem posse ad illam beatitudinem peruenire, nisi hos circuitus, ubi beatitudo et miseria uicissim alternant, in huius uitae eruditione cognouerit: quo modo ergo fatentur, quanto plus quisque amauerit Deum, tanto eum facilius ad beatitudinem peruenturum, qui ea docent, quibus amor ipse torpescat? Nam quis non remissius et tepidius amet eum, quem se cogitat necessario deserturum et contra eius ueritatem sapientiamque sensurum, et hoc cum ad eius plenam pro sua capacitate notitiam beatitudinis perfectione peruenerit? quando nec hominem amicum possit quisque amare fideliter, cui se futurum nouit inimicum. Sed absit ut uera sint, quae nobis minantur ueram miseriam numquam finiendam, sed interpositionibus falsae beatitudinis saepe ac sine fine rumpendam. Quid enim illa beatitudine falsius atque fallacius, ubi nos futuros miseros aut in tanta ueritatis luce nesciamus aut in summa felicitatis arce timeamus? Si enim uenturam calamitatem ignoraturi sumus, peritior est hic nostra miseria, ubi uenturam beatitudinem nouimus; si autem nos illic clades inminens non latebit, beatius tempora transigit anima misera, quibus transactis ad beatitudinem subleuetur, quam beata, quibus transactis in miseriam reuoluatur. Atque ita spes nostrae infelicitatis est felix et felicitatis infelix. Vnde fit, ut, quia hic mala praesentia patimur, ibi metuimus inminentia, uerius semper miseri quam beati aliquando esse possimus.
But if they say that no one can attain to that happiness, unless he has learned these cycles, where happiness and misery alternate in turn, in the education of this life: in what way then do they admit that the more each one loves God, the more easily will he attain to happiness, who teach them, to whom love itself numb? For who will not love him more leniently and tepidly, whom he thinks he will necessarily desert, and will feel contrary to his truth and wisdom, and this when he has arrived at his full knowledge of his capacity for the perfection of bliss? when no one can faithfully love even a man as a friend, to whom he knows that he will become an enemy. But it is far from being true, which threaten us with true misery never to end, but to be broken often and endlessly by the interposition of false happiness. For what is more false and deceptive than that happiness, where we either do not know our future wretchedness in such a light of truth or fear it in the highest fortress of happiness? For if we are to be ignorant of future calamity, our misery here is more experienced, where we know future happiness; but if the calamity which threatens us there does not hide us, the miserable soul will pass happier times, when it is passed, it is relieved to happiness, than the blessed, when it is passed, it is returned to misery. And so the hope of our unhappiness is happy and our happiness unhappy. Whence it comes to pass that, because here we suffer the presence of evil, and there we fear impending things, we may always be more truly miserable than happy at any time.
しかし、もし彼らが、現世の教育において、幸福と不幸が交互にやってく るこれらのサイクルを学ばなければ、誰もその幸福に到達することはできない、と言うならば、では彼らは、各人が神を愛すれば愛するほど、より容易に幸福に 到達することを認めるのだろうか。なぜなら、至福の完成のための自分の能力を完全に知るに至ったとき、自分が必然的に見捨てることになり、自分の真理と知 恵に反すると感じることになると考えている人を、誰がもっと甘く、生ぬるく愛さないだろうか。しかし、真の不幸は決して終わることなく、偽りの幸福の妨害 によってしばしば際限なく破られると脅すのは、真実とはほど遠い。なぜなら、そのような真実の光の中で将来の惨めさを知らないか、幸福という最高の要塞の 中でそれを恐れているような幸福ほど、偽りで欺瞞的なものがあるだろうか。将来の災難を知らないというのであれば、将来の幸福を知っているここでの不幸の 方が、より経験的である。しかし、そこでわれわれを脅かす災難がわれわれを隠さないのであれば、悲惨な魂は、それが過ぎ去れば幸福に安堵され、それが過ぎ 去れば不幸に帰する祝福された魂よりも、より幸福な時を過ごすことになる。不幸の希望は幸福であり、幸福は不幸なのである。それゆえ、ここでは悪の存在に 苦しみ、そこでは差し迫った事態を恐れるので、私たちはいつでも、幸福であるよりも真に惨めであることの方が多いのである。
Sed quoniam haec falsa sunt clamante pietate, conuincente ueritate (illa enim nobis ueraciter promittitur uera felicitas, cuius erit semper retinenda et nulla infelicitate rumpenda certa securitas): uiam rectam sequentes, quod nobis est Christus, eo duce ac saluatore a uano et inepto impiorum circuitu iter fidei mentemque auertamus. Si enim de istis circuitibus et sine cessatione alternantibus itionibus et reditionibus animarum Porphyrius Platonicus suorum opinionem sequi noluit, siue ipsius rei uanitate permotus siue iam tempora Christiana reueritus, et, quod in libro decimo commemoraui, dicere maluit animam propter cognoscenda mala traditam mundo, ut ab eis liberata atque purgata, cum ad Patrem redierit, nihil ulterius tale patiatur: quanto magis nos istam inimicam Christianae fidei falsitatem detestari ac deuitare debemus! His autem circuitibus euacuatis atque frustratis nulla necessitas nos compellit ideo putare non habere initium temporis ex quo esse coeperit genus humanum, quia per nescio quos circuitus nihil sit in rebus noui, quod non et antea certis interuallis temporum fuerit et postea sit futurum. Si enim liberatur anima non reditura ad miserias, sicut numquam antea liberata est: fit in illa aliquid, quod antea numquam factum est, et hoc quidem ualde magnum, id est quae numquam desinat aeterna felicitas. Si autem in natura inmortali fit tanta nouitas nullo repetita, nullo repetenda circuitu: cur in rebus mortalibus fieri non posse contenditur? Si dicunt non fieri in anima beatitudinis nouitatem, quoniam ad eam reuertitur, in qua semper fuit, ipsa certe liberatio noua fit, cum de miseria liberatur in qua numquam fuit, et ipsa miseriae nouitas in ea facta est quae numquam fuit. Haec autem nouitas si non in rerum, quae diuina prouidentia gubernantur, ordinem uenit, sed casu potius euenit, ubi sunt illi determinati dimensique circuitus, in quibus nulla noua fiunt, sed repetuntur eadem quae fuerunt? Si autem et haec nouitas ab ordinatione prouidentiae non excluditur, siue data sit anima siue lapsa sit: possunt fieri noua, quae neque antea facta sint nec tamen a rerum ordine aliena sint. Et si potuit anima per inprudentiam facere sibi nouam miseriam, quae non esset inprouisa diuinae prouidentiae, ut hanc quoque in rerum ordine includeret et ab hac eam non inprouide liberaret: qua tandem temeritate humanae uanitatis audemus negare diuinitatem facere posse res, non sibi, sed mundo nouas, quas neque antea fecerit nec umquam habuerit inprouisas? Si autem dicunt liberatas quidem animas ad miseriam non reuersuras, sed cum hoc fit in rebus nihil noui fieri, quoniam semper aliae atque aliae liberatae sunt et liberantur et liberabuntur: hoc certe concedunt, si ita est, nouas animas fieri, quibus sit et noua miseria et noua liberatio. Nam si antiquas eas esse dicunt et retrorsum sempiternas, ex quibus cotidie noui fiant homines, de quorum corporibus, si sapienter uixerint, ita liberentur, ut numquam ad miserias reuoluantur, consequenter dicturi sunt infinitas. Quantuslibet namque finitus numerus fuisset animarum, infinitis retro saeculis sufficere non ualeret, ut ex illo semper homines fierent, quorum essent animae ab ista semper mortalitate liberandae, numquam ad eam deinceps rediturae. Nec ullo modo explicabunt, quo modo in rebus, quas, ut Deo notae esse possint, finitas uolunt, infinitus sit numerus animarum.
But since these are falsities, crying out with piety, persuading with truth (for we are truly promised true happiness, the sure security of which will always be retained and broken by no unhappiness): following the right way, which is for us Christ, that guide and savior from the vain and foolish circle of the ungodly let us turn aside the way of faith and the mind. For if Porphyry Platonius refused to follow the opinion of his fellow-citizens concerning these circuits and without ceasing the alternate goings and returns of souls, either he was moved by the vanity of the matter itself, or he had already rejected the Christian times, and, as I mentioned in the tenth book, he preferred to say that the soul was delivered to the world because of known evils, as from freed and cleansed by them, when he returns to the Father, nothing more like this should be suffered: how much more should we detest and deplore this enemy of the falsity of the Christian faith! But by these circuits, exhausted and frustrated, no necessity compels us to think that there is no beginning of time from which the human race began to exist, because through I do not know what circuits there is nothing new in things, which has not been before at certain intervals of time, and will be afterwards. For if the soul is freed, it will not return to miseries, as it has never been freed before: something happens in it that has never happened before, and this indeed is very great, that is what eternal happiness never ceases. But if in the nature of the immortal something so great a new thing is done without repeating it, without repeating it in a circuit, why is it contended that it cannot be done in mortal things? If they say that the newness of happiness does not take place in the soul, since it returns to it, in which it has always been, certainly the new deliverance itself takes place, when it is delivered from the misery in which it never was, and the very newness of misery is made in that which never was. But if this newness did not come about in the order of things, which are governed by divine providence, but rather happened by chance, where are those determined and circular dimensions in which no new things are made, but the same things that were are repeated? But if even this newness is not excluded from the arrangement of providence, whether the soul is given or fallen, new things may be made which were neither previously made nor yet alien to the order of things. And if the soul could, through imprudence, bring upon itself a new misery, which would not be unprovided for by divine providence, that it might include this also in the order of things, and deliver it from this without imprudence: with what rashness of human vanity do we dare to deny that divinity can make things, not for itself, but for the world new things, which he had neither done before, nor had he ever used before? But if they say that souls who have been liberated will not return to misery, but when this happens nothing new will happen in things, since some and others have always been liberated and are being liberated and will be liberated: they certainly grant this, if this is so, to become new souls, to whom there will also be new misery and a new deliverance. For if they say that they are ancient and eternal in retrospect, from which new men are made every day, of whose bodies, if they have lived wisely, they are so freed that they never return to miseries, they will consequently say infinite. For however finite the number of souls might have been, it would not have been sufficient for the infinite back ages, so that men would always be made from it, whose souls would always be freed from that mortality, never to return to it thereafter. Nor will they in any way explain how, in the things which they wish to be finite, that they may be known to God, the number of souls is infinite.
しかし、これらは偽りであるから、信心をもって叫び、真理をもって説得 し(私たちは真に真の幸福を約束されているのであり、その確実な保障は常に保持され、いかなる不幸によっても破られることはないのである)、正しい道、す なわち、私たちにとってキリストであり、その導き手であり、救い主であるキリストに従って、むなしく愚かな神ならぬ者たちの輪から離れ、信仰と心の道に向 かおう。もしポルフィリ・プラトニウスが、これらの回路と魂の交互の往来と帰還に関する彼の同胞の意見に従うことを拒んだとすれば、彼はそのこと自体の虚 栄に動かされたか、あるいはすでにキリスト教の時代を拒絶していたかのいずれかであり、第10巻で述べたように、彼は、魂は既知の悪のためにこの世に引き 渡されたのであって、御父のもとに帰るときには、それらによって解放され、清められるのであって、これ以上このようなことに苦しむべきでないと言うことを 好んだのである: 私たちは、キリスト教信仰の虚偽の敵であるこの人を、どれほど憎み、嘆かわしいと思うことだろう!というのも、どのような回路を通して、物事には何一つ新 しいものはなく、それは一定の時間の間隔で以前にもなかったことであり、その後もそうであろうからである。魂が解放されたとしても、それまで解放されたこ とのないような不幸に戻ることはない。しかし、不滅のものの本性において、これほど偉大なことが、それを繰り返すことなく、一巡することなく、新たに行わ れるのであれば、なぜ、死すべきものにおいては、それが行われないと主張されるのか。もし彼らが、幸福の新しさは魂には起こらないと言うなら、それは魂が 常にあったものに戻るからである。しかし、もしこの新しさが、神の摂理に支配された物事の秩序の中で生じたのではなく、むしろ偶然に生じたのだとしたら、 新しいものがつくられることなく、以前と同じものが繰り返される、決定された円環的な次元はどこにあるのだろうか。しかし、もしこの新しささえも摂理の取 り決めから排除されないとすれば、魂が与えられても堕落しても、以前には作られておらず、まだ物事の秩序から外れていない新しいものが作られるかもしれな い。そして、魂が軽率さによって、神の摂理が用意しないはずのない新たな不幸を自らにもたらすことができたとすれば、それは神の摂理がこれもまた物事の秩 序に含め、軽率さなしにこれを救い出すことができるかもしれない。しかし、もし彼らが、解放された魂は不幸に戻ることはない、しかしそうなっても物事には 何も新しいことは起こらない、と言うならば、ある者も他の者も常に解放されており、解放されつつあり、解放されるであろう。というのも、もし彼らが、自分 たちは古代のものであり、振り返ってみれば永遠のものであり、そこから毎日新しい人間が作られ、その肉体は、もし彼らが賢明に生きたならば、決して不幸に 戻ることがないように解放されるのだと言うならば、彼らは結果的に無限であると言うことになるからである。というのも、魂の数がいかに有限であったとして も、それは無限に遡る時代には十分ではなく、そこから常に人間が作られ、その魂は常に死すべきものから解放され、その後は決して死すべきものに戻ることは ないからである。また彼らは、神に知ってもらうために有限であることを望む事柄において、魂の数が無限であることを説明しようとはしない。
Quapropter quoniam circuitus illi iam explosi sunt, quibus ad easdem miserias necessario putabatur anima reditura: quid restat conuenientius pietati quam credere non esse inpossibile Deo et ea, quae numquam fecerit, noua facere et ineffabili praescientia uoluntatem mutabilem non habere? Porro autem utrum animarum liberatarum nec ulterius ad miserias rediturarum numerus possit semper augeri, ipsi uiderint, qui de rerum infinitate cohibenda tam subtiliter disputant; nos uero ratiocinationem nostram ex utroque latere terminamus. Si enim potest, quid causae est, ut negetur creari potuisse quod numquam antea creatum esset, si liberatarum animarum numerus, qui numquam antea fuit, non solum factus est semel, sed fieri numquam desinet? Si autem oportet ut certus sit liberatarum aliquis numerus animarum, quae ad miseriam numquam redeant, neque iste numerus ulterius augeatur: etiam ipse sine dubio, quicumque erit, ante utique numquam fuit; qui profecto crescere et ad suae quantitatis terminum peruenire sine aliquo non posset initio; quod initium eo modo antea numquam fuit. Hoc ergo ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit.
Therefore, since those circles have already been exploded, to which it was thought that the soul would necessarily return to the same miseries: what remains more suitable to piety than to believe that it is not impossible for God and to do new things that he has never done, and that he does not have a changeable will with ineffable foreknowledge? Moreover, whether the number of souls liberated, or of those who are further returned to miseries, can always be increased, let those who debate so minutely about the infinity of things to be restrained have seen; indeed we terminate our reasoning from both sides. For if it is possible, what reason is there to deny that things could have been created that had never been created before, if the number of redeemed souls, which had never been before, was not only once made, but never ceases to be made? But if there must be a certain number of souls that have been saved, who will never return to misery, and this number must not be further increased: without a doubt he himself, whoever he may be, certainly never was before; which certainly could not grow and reach the limit of its size without something to begin with; that there had never been a beginning in that way before. So that this might be, man was created, before whom there was none.
それゆえ、魂は必然的に同じ不幸に戻ると考えられていたこれらの円環は すでに爆発したのであるから、神にとって不可能なことではなく、神が行ったことのない新しいことを行うことは不可能ではないこと、また、神は計り知れない 予知を持つ変わりやすい意志を持っていないことを信じること以上に、信心にふさわしいことが残されているだろうか。さらに、解放された魂や、さらに不幸に 戻された魂の数を常に増やすことができるかどうか、抑制されるべきものの無限性について仔細に議論する人々に見てもらおう。というのも、もしそれが可能で あるならば、それまで一度も創造されたことのなかったものが創造された可能性を否定する理由がどこにあろうか、もしそれまで一度も創造されたことのなかっ た贖われた魂の数が、一度作られただけでなく、決して作られ続けることがないとしたら。しかし、救われた魂の数は一定でなければならず、その数は決して不 幸に戻ることはなく、これ以上増やしてはならないのであれば、間違いなく、彼自身は、彼が誰であろうと、以前は確かに存在しなかったのである。そうなるよ うに、人間は創造されたのである。
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