Lastly, there is one more point of view from which we must consider our problem. A gambler such as we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs, who placed his bets only upon the longest series (however arranged), would almost certainly be ruined. But this would not be so if there were a coalition of gamblers betting on the same series at several different tables, with an agreement that they would pool the numbers which each of them might reqpiire to proceed with his series. For if I, for instance, have already got 21 and 22 myself, and need 23 to go on, there is obviously more chance of its turning up if 10 tables, instead of only one, are in play. The situation of the various cultures which have achieved the most cumulative forms of history is very similar. Such history has never been produced by isolated cultures but by cultures which, voluntarily or involuntarily, have combined their play and, by a wide variety of means (migration, borrowing, trade and warfare), have formed such coalitions as we have visualized in our example. This brings out very clearly the absurdity of claiming that one culture is superior to another. For, if a culture were left to its own resources, it could never hope to be "superior"; like the single gambler, it would never manage to achieve more than short series of a few units, and the prospect of a long series' turning up in its history (though not theoretically impossible) would be so slight that all hope of it would depend on the ability to con- tinue the game for a time infinitely longer than the whole period of human history to date. But, as we said above, no single culture stands alone; it is always part of a coalition including other cultures, and, for that reason, is able to build up cumulative series. The probability of a long series' appearing naturally depends on the scope, duration and variation allowed for in the organization of the coalition. Two consequences follow. In the course of this study, we have several times raised the question why mankind remained stationary for nine-tenths or even more of its history; the earliest civilizations date back 41 from 200,000 to 500,000 years, while living conditions have been transformed only in the last 10,000 years. If we are correct in our analysis, the reason was not that palaeolithic man was less intelligent or less gifted than his neolithic successor, but simply that, in human history, the combination took a time to come about; it might have occurred much earlier or much later. There is no more significance in this than there is in the number of spins a gambler has to wait before a given combination is produced; it might happen at the first spin, the thousandth, the millionth or never. But, throughout that time of waiting, humanity, like the gambler, goes on betting. Not always of its own free will, and not always appreciating exactly what it is doing, it "sets up business" in culture, embarks on "operation civilization", achieving varying measures of success in each of its under- takings. In some cases, it very nearly succeeds, in others, it endangers its earlier gains. The great simplifications which are permissible because of our ignorance of most aspects of prehistoric societies help to illustrate more closely this hesitant progress, with its manifold ramifications. There can be no more striking examples of regression than the descent from the peak of Levallois culture to the mediocrity of the Mousterian civilization, or from the splendour of the Auri- gnacian and Solutrean cultures to the rudeness of the Magda- lenean, and to the extreme contrasts we find in the various aspects of mesolithic culture. What is true in time is equally true in space, although it must be expressed in a different way. A culture's chance of uniting the complex body of inventions of all sorts which we describe as a civilization depends on the number and diversity of the other cultures with which it is working out, generally involuntarily, a common strategy. Number and diversity: a comparison of the Old World with the New on the eve of the latter 's discovery provides a good illustration of the need for these two factors. Europe at the beginning of the Renaissance was the meeting- place and melting-pot of the most diverse influences: the Greek, Roman, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon traditions com- bined with the influences of Arabia and China. Pre-Columbian America enjoyed no fewer cultural contacts, quantitatively speaking, as the various American cultures maintained relations with one another and the two Americas together represent a whole hemisphere. But, while the cultures which were cross- fertilizing each other in Europe had resulted from diffcren- 42 tiation dating back several tens of thousands of years, those on the more recently occupied American continent had had less time to develop divergences; the picture they offered was relatively homogeneous. Thus, although it would not be true to say that the cultural standard of Mexico or Peru was inferior to that of Europe at the time of the discovery (we have in fact seen that, in some respects, it was superior), the various aspects of culture were possibly less well organized in relation to each other. Side by side with amazing achieve- ments, we find strange deficiencies in the pre-Columbian civilizations; there are, so to speak, gaps in them. They also afford evidence of the coexistence — not so contradictory as it may seem — of relatively advanced forms of culture with others which were abortive. Their organization, less flexible and diversified, probably explains their collapse before a handful of conquerors. And the underlying reason for this may be sought in the fact that the partners to the American cultural "coalition" were less dissimilar from one another than their counterparts in the Old World. No society is therefore essentially and intrinsically cumu- lative. Cumulative history is not the prerogative of certain races or certain cultures, marking them off from the rest. It is the result of their conduct rather than their Jiature. It represents a certain "way of life" of cultures which depends on their capacity to "go-along-together". In this sense, it may be said that cumulative history is the type of history charac- teristic of grouped societies — social super-organisms — while stationary history (supposing it to exist) would be the distinguishing feature of an inferior form of social life, the isolated society. The one real calamity, the one fatal flaw which can afflict a group of men and prevent them from fulfilment is to be alone. We can thus see how clumsy and intellectually unsatisfactory the generally accepted efforts to defend the contributions of various human races and cultures to civilization often are. We list features, we sift questions of origin, we allot first places. However well-intentioned they may be, these efforts serve no purpose, for, in three respects, they miss their aim. In the first place, there can never be any certainty about a particular culture's credit for an invention or discovery. For 100 years, it was firmly believed that maize had been produced by the American Indians, by crossing wild grasses; this explanation is still accepted for the time being, but there is increasing doubt about it, for it may well be, after all, that 43 maize was introduced into America (we cannot tell when or how) from South-East Asia. In the second place, all cultural contributions can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, we have isolated acqui- sitions or features, whose importance is evident but which are also somewhat limited. It is a fact that tobacco came from America; but after all, and despite the best efforts of inter- national institutions, we cannot feel overwhelmed with gratitude to the American Indians every time we smoke a cigarette. Tobacco is a delightful adjunct to the art of living, as other adjuncts are useful (such as rubber) ; we are indebted to these things for pleasures and conveniences we should not otherwise enjoy, but if we were deprived of them, our civi- lization would not rock on its foundations and, had there been any pressing need, we could have found them for ourselves or substituted something else for them. At the other end of the scale (with a whole series of inter- mediates, of course), there are systematized contributions, representing the peculiar form in which each society has chosen to express and satisfy the generality of human aspirations. There is no denying the originality and particularity of these patterns, but, as they all represent the exclusive choice of a single group, it is difficult to see how one civilization can hope to benefit from the way of life of another, unless it is prepared to renounce its own individuality. Attempted com- promises are, in fact, likely to produce only two results: either the disorganization and collapse of the pattern of one of the groups; or a new combination, which then, however, represents the emergence of a third pattern, and cannot be assimilated to either of the others. The question with which we are con- cerned, indeed, is not to discover whether or not a society can derive benefit from the way of life of its neighbours, but whether, and if so to what extent, it can succeed in under- standing or even in knowing them. We have already seen that there can be no definite reply to this question. Finally, wherever a contribution is made, there must be a recipient. But, while there are in fact real cultures which can be localized in time and space, and which may be said to have "contributed" and to be continuing their contributions, what can this "world civilization" be, which is supposed to be the recipient of all these contributions.!^ It is not another civilization distinct from all the others, and yet real in the same sense that they are. When we speak of world civilization, we have in mind no single period, no single group of men: 44 we are employing an abstract conception, to which we attribute a moral or logical significance — moral, if we are thinking of an aim to be pursued by existing societies; logical, if we are using the one term to cover the common features which analysis may reveal in the different cultures. In both cases, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that the concept of world civilization is very sketchy and imperfect, and that its intellectual and emotional content is tenuous. To attempt to assess cultural confribulions with all the weight of count- less centuries behind them, rich with the thoughts and sorrows, hopes and toil of the men and women who brought them into being, by reference to the sole yard-stick of a world civilization which is still a hollow shell, would be greatly to impoverish them, draining away their life-blood and leaving nothing but the bare bones behind. We have sought, on the contrary, to show that the true contribution of a culture consists, not in the list of inventions which it has personally produced, but in its difference from others. The sense of gratitude and respect which each single member of a given culture can and should feel towards all others can only be based on the conviction that the other cultures differ from his own in countless ways, even if the ultimate essence of these differences eludes him or if, in spite of his best efforts, he can reach no more than an imperfect understanding of them. Secondly, Ave have taken the notion of world civilization as a sort of limiting concept or as an epitome of a highly complex process. If our arguments are valid, there is not, and can never be, a world civilization in the absolute sense in which that term is often used, since civilization implies, and indeed consists in, the coexistence of cultures exhibiting the maxi- mum possible diversities. A world civilization could, in fact, represent no more than a world-wide coalition of cultures, each of which would preserve its oAvn originality. 45

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リンク

• レヴィ＝ストロー ス『人種と歴史』について
  

文献

• Race and history / by Claude Lévi-Strauss, [Paris] : Unesco , c1958 [1952]. - (Race question in modern science)
  

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