スピノザとイデオロギー：On Spinozist's ideology

スピノザとイデオロギー

On Spinozist's ideology

スピノザの時代には、イデオロギーという術語はなかった。しかし、アルチュセールは、その可能性を、『エチカ』の中のイマギナティオのなかにみていた。

以下は、スピノザ『エチカ』第２部定理17にある文章である（英訳はこちらから）。

PROPOSITIO XVII. Si humanum corpus affectum est modo, qui naturam corporis alicuius externi involvit, mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut sibi praesens contemplabitur, donec corpus afficiatur affectu, qui eiusdem corporis existentiam vel praesentiam secludat.	PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
DEMONSTRATIO. Patet. Nam quamdiu corpus humanum sic affectum est, tamdiu mens humana (per prop. 12. huius) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur, hoc est (per prop. praeced.), ideam habebit modi actu existentis, quae naturam corporis externi involvit, hoc est, ideam, quae existentiam, vel praesentiam naturae corporis externi non secludit, sed ponit. Adeoque mens (per coroll. 1. praeced.) corpus externum ut actu existens, vel ut praesens contemplabitur, donec afficiatur etc. Q. E. D.	Proof.—This proposition is self—evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body—that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.
COROLLARIUM. Mens corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec praesentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit, velut praesentia essent.	Corollary.—The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.
DEMONSTRATIO. Dum corpora externa corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant, ut in molliores saepe impingant, earum plana (per postul. 5.) mutant. Unde fit (vide axiom. 2. post coroll. lem. 3.) ut inde alio modo reflectantur, quam antea solebant, et ut etiam postea iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo, eodem modo reflectantur, ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsae sunt, et consequenter, ut corpus humanum, dum sic reflexae moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo mens (per prop. 12. huius) iterum cogitabit, hoc est (per prop. 17. huius) mens iterum corpus externum ut praesens contemplabitur; et hoc toties, quoties corporis humani partes fluidae spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent. Quare quamvis corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, mens tamen eadem toties ut praesentia contemplabitur, quoties haec corporis actio repetetur. Q. E. D.	Proof.—When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take cognizance—that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.
SCHOLIUM. Videmus itaque, qui fieri potest, ut ea, quae non sunt veluti praesentia contemplemur, ut saepe fit. Et fieri potest, ut hoc aliis de causis contingat. Sed mihi hic sufficit ostendisse unam, per quam rem sic possim explicare, ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem; nec tamen credo, me a vera longe aberrare, quandoquidem omnia illa quae sumpsi postulata vix quicquam continent, quod non constet experientia, de qua nobis non licet dubitare, postquam ostendimus corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere (vide coroll. post prop. 13. huius). Praeterea (ex coroll. praeced. et coroll. 2. prop. 16. huius) clare intelligimus, quaenam sit differentia inter ideam ex. gr. Petri, quae essentiam mentis ipsius Petri constituit, et inter ideam ipsius Petri, quae in alio homine, puta in Paulo, est. Illa enim essentiam corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat, nec existentiam involvit nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; haec autem magis constitutionem corporis Pauli, quam Petri naturam indicat, et ideo durante illa corporis Pauli constitutione mens Pauli, quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi praesentem contemplabitur. Porro, ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideae corpora externa velut nobis praesentia repraesentant, r e r u m i m a g i n e s vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem i m a g i n a r i dicemus. Atque hic, ut, quid sit e r r o r , indicare incipiam, notetis velim, m e n t i s i m a g i n a t i o n e s in se spectatas nihil erroris continere, sive mentem ex eo, quod imaginatur, non errare; sed tantum quatenus consideratur, carere idea, quae existentiam illarum rerum, quas sibi praesentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens, dum res non existentes ut sibi praesentes imaginatur, simul sciret, res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suae naturae, non vitio tribueret; praesertim si haec imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet, hoc est (per defin. 7. P. 1.) si haec mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.	Note.—We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present many things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non—existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature—that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.

+++++

以下は、スピノザ『エチカ』第２部定理17にある文章である。

定理. 第17項人間の身体が、外部の身体の性質に関わるような影響を受けた場合、人間の心は、その外部の身体の存在や存在を排除するような形で人間の身体が影響を受けるまでは、その外部の身体を実際に存在するもの、あるいは自分自身に存在するものとみなす。	PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
証明-この命題は自明である。というのも、人間の身体がこのような影響を受け続ける限り、人間の心（Ⅱ. xii.）は身体のこの変化をみなすからである。言い換えれば、外なる身体の本性を排除するのではなく、その存在または存在を仮定する考えを持つことになる。したがって、（II.16.のCoroll.i.によって）心は、外なる身体が影響を受けるまでは、外なる身体を実際に存在するものとみなすことになる。Q.E.D.	Proof.—This proposition is self—evident, for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body—that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.
補論：心は、人体がかつて影響を受けた外的な物体を、たとえそれがもはや存在しないものであっても、あるいは現存しないものであっても、現存するものとみなすことができる。	Corollary.—The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.
証明-外界の物体が人体の流動的な部分を決定し、それがしばしば軟らかい部分に衝突するとき、それらは最後の名前の表面を変化させる（Post、それゆえ（Ax. ii., Lemma iii.のCoroll.に従い）、それらはそこから、そのような変化の前に従っていたのとは異なる方法で屈折し、さらに、その後、それら自身の自発的な運動によって新しい表面に衝突するとき、それらは、あたかも外的な物体によってそれらの表面に向かって衝き動かされたかのように、同じ方法で屈折する。その結果、それらは、このように屈折し続ける間、同じ方法で人体に影響を及ぼし、心（II. つまり（II. xvii.）、人体の流体部分が自らの自発的な運動によって前述の表面に衝突するたびに、心は再び外部体を存在するものと見なし、そうするのである。したがって、人体が一度影響を受けた外的な身体はもはや存在しないが、それでも心は、人体のこの作用が繰り返されるたびに、それらを存在するとみなすようになる。Q.E.D.	Proof.—When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take cognizance—that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.
註- このようにして、よくあることだが、私たちが、そうでない多くのものを現在あると見なすのはなぜなのかがわかる。同じ結果が他の原因によってもたらされる可能性もあるが、私はここで、真の原因を指摘したのと同じように、一つの可能性のある説明を示しただけで十分だと思う。というのも、私の仮説はすべて、ほとんど例外なく経験に基づくものであり、私たちと同じように、私たちが感じているような人体が存在することを示した人たち（II.xiii.の後の Coroll.）さらに（II.vii. Coroll.、II.xvi. Coroll.ii.）、われわれは、たとえばペテロの心の本質を構成するペテロの観念と、別の人間、たとえばパウロの中にある当該ペテロの観念との間に、どのような違いがあるのかを明確に理解している。前者はペテロ自身の肉体の本質に直接的に答えるものであり、ペテロが存在する限り存在することを意味するだけである。後者はペテロの本質よりもむしろパウロの肉体の性質を示すものであり、したがって、パウロの肉体のこの性質が持続する間は、パウロの心は、たとえペテロがもはや存在しないとしても、ペテロを自分自身にとって存在するものとみなすのである。さらに、通常の言い方を踏襲するならば、人間の肉体の変化は、観念が外的な肉体をわれわれに現前するものとして表象するものであり、われわれはそれを、ものの姿を想起するものではないが、ものの像と呼ぶことにする。心がこのように身体を見るとき、私たちはそれを「想像する」と言う。私はここで、誤りはどこにあるのかを示すために、心の想像それ自体に誤りはないという事実に注意を喚起する。心が誤るのは、単に想像するという行為においてではなく、想像がないものとみなされる限りにおいてのみであり、それは、心に存在すると想像するものの存在を排除するものである。もし心が、存在しないものを自分にとって存在するものとして想像しながら、同時に、それらが実際には存在しないことを意識するならば、この想像の力は、その本性の効力に帰すべきであり、誤りに帰すべきものではない。	Note.—We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present many things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non—existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature—that is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.

+++++

イマジナティオは、備考（SCHOLIUM）のなかに登場する。すなわち、人間の身体の情動（アフェクティオ）は、ものの形としては登場しないが、物の表象（イマーゴ）と我々は呼んでおり、精神が物体を観想する時に、物の表象する（イマギナリ）という。このような精神の表象（イマギナティオ）そのものは誤りではないが、「そのようなものはありえない」と我々自身が排除してしまう点において、誤り（e r r o r ）を犯しているという。「もし精神のこの表象能力が自由であったとしたら、なおさらそうであろう（si haec mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset）」（畠中訳 2006:122）。

アルチュセールに言わせると、イデオロギーとは「自分は外にあるにも関わらず、自分の外にはないもの」という自己矛盾したものであるということだ（上野 2014:226-227）。アルチュセールのテーゼだと「イデオロギーには外がない、と同時にイデオロギーは外にしかない」「イデオロギーには歴史がない」「イデオロギーは永遠である」ということになり、スピノザにおける精神の表象（イマギナティオ）がもつ、イデオロギーの自己矛盾と極めてよくにていることにある（アルチュセール 1974[1978]）。